A história

Legislação Antijaponesa na Califórnia


O governo japonês ficou compreensivelmente preocupado com o tratamento dispensado aos emigrantes que viviam nos Estados Unidos. Theodore Roosevelt agiu em 1908 para conter as tensões anteriores, mas a situação racial havia se aquecido novamente, no início do primeiro mandato de Wilson.As raízes da ansiedade na Califórnia eram variadas. No entanto, a antipatia pelos japoneses era especialmente aguda por causa de uma forte ética de trabalho que permitia a muitos deles ter sucesso em seus empreendimentos e acumular grandes propriedades de terra. Esta última característica tornou-se o objeto de um projeto de lei em análise pelo legislativo da Califórnia. O governo japonês protestou veementemente a Wilson, que despachou o secretário de Estado William Jennings Bryan para a Califórnia em um esforço condenado para impedir que a medida se tornasse lei. As tensões se desenvolveram a tal ponto que rumores de guerra circularam amplamente. No final, a crise se dissipou, devido em grande parte ao reconhecimento japonês da tentativa sincera de Wilson de impedir a aprovação da legislação e também ao entendimento de que um presidente não poderia ditar a política de Estado A questão fundiária na Califórnia era mais uma em uma lista crescente de questões que prejudicavam as relações entre os Estados Unidos e o Japão.


Para outras atividades de relações exteriores da Wilson.


Uma breve história da realocação nipo-americana durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial

se exercitando em Manzanar

Em 7 de dezembro de 1941, os Estados Unidos entraram na Segunda Guerra Mundial quando o Japão atacou a base naval dos EUA em Pearl Harbor. Naquela época, quase 113.000 pessoas de ascendência japonesa, dois terços deles cidadãos americanos, viviam na Califórnia, Washington e Oregon. Em 19 de fevereiro de 1942, o presidente Franklin D. Roosevelt assinou a Ordem Executiva No. 9066 autorizando o Exército dos EUA a designar áreas das quais "qualquer ou todas as pessoas podem ser excluídas". Nenhuma pessoa de ascendência japonesa vivendo nos Estados Unidos foi condenada por qualquer ato sério de espionagem ou sabotagem durante a guerra. No entanto, essas pessoas inocentes foram removidas de suas casas e colocadas em centros de realocação, muitos deles durante a guerra. Em contraste, entre 1942 e 1944, 18 caucasianos foram julgados por espionagem para o Japão, pelo menos dez foram condenados em tribunal.

Para entender por que o governo dos Estados Unidos decidiu remover os nipo-americanos da Costa Oeste na maior realocação forçada da história dos EUA, é preciso considerar muitos fatores. Preconceito, histeria de guerra e política contribuíram para essa decisão.

Preconceito anti-asiático da costa oeste

Os preconceitos anti-asiáticos, especialmente na Califórnia, começaram como sentimentos anti-chineses. As forças culturais e econômicas que levaram aos sentimentos anti-japoneses são discutidas em detalhes por Daniels e resumidas aqui. A imigração chinesa para os EUA começou quase ao mesmo tempo que a corrida do ouro na Califórnia em 1849. Durante as fases iniciais do boom econômico que acompanhou a corrida do ouro, a mão de obra chinesa era necessária e bem-vinda. No entanto, logo os trabalhadores brancos começaram a considerar os chineses, que em 1870 representavam cerca de 10% da população da Califórnia, como concorrentes. Esta competição econômica aumentou após a conclusão da Ferrovia Transcontinental União-Pacífico Central em 1869, que empregou cerca de 10.000 trabalhadores chineses. A mão de obra chinesa era barata, e essa queixa econômica se tornou uma ideologia de inferioridade asiática semelhante aos preconceitos raciais americanos existentes. A discriminação tornou-se legislada em nível estadual e federal, incluindo um projeto de lei de exclusão da imigração chinesa aprovado em 1882 pelo Congresso dos EUA.

As experiências dos imigrantes chineses prenunciaram as dos imigrantes japoneses, que começaram a chegar mais ou menos na mesma época em que o projeto de exclusão da China foi aprovado. Os imigrantes japoneses eram chamados de issei, a partir da combinação das palavras japonesas para "um" e "geração". Seus filhos, a segunda geração nascida nos Estados Unidos, são nisseis, e a terceira geração é sansei. Nisei e Sansei que foram educados no Japão são chamados Kibei. Os isseis vinham principalmente do interior do Japão e geralmente chegavam, seja no Havaí ou na costa oeste do continente, com muito pouco dinheiro. Aproximadamente metade tornou-se agricultor, enquanto outros foram para os centros urbanos costeiros e trabalharam em pequenos estabelecimentos comerciais, geralmente para si próprios ou para outros Issei.

Movimentos anti-japoneses começaram logo após o início da imigração japonesa, surgindo de preconceitos anti-asiáticos existentes. No entanto, o movimento anti-japonês se espalhou por volta de 1905, devido tanto ao aumento da imigração quanto à vitória japonesa sobre a Rússia, a primeira derrota de uma nação ocidental por uma nação asiática nos tempos modernos. Tanto o issei quanto o Japão começaram a ser vistos como ameaças. A discriminação incluiu a formação de organizações anti-japonesas, como a Liga de Exclusão Asiática, tentativas de segregação escolar (que acabou afetando Nisei sob a doutrina de "separados, mas iguais") e um número crescente de ataques violentos contra indivíduos e empresas.

O governo japonês posteriormente protestou contra esse tratamento de seus cidadãos. Para manter a amizade nipo-americana, o presidente Theodore Roosevelt tentou negociar um meio-termo, convencendo o conselho escolar de São Francisco a revogar a ordem segregacionista, impedindo a legislatura da Califórnia de aprovar mais legislação anti-japonesa e elaborar o que ficou conhecido como "Acordo de Cavalheiros "com o governo japonês. Com isso, o governo japonês concordou em limitar a emigração para o território continental dos Estados Unidos aos trabalhadores que já haviam estado nos Estados Unidos antes e aos pais, esposas e filhos dos trabalhadores que já estivessem lá.

Em 1913, a Califórnia aprovou a Lei de Terras Estrangeiras que proibia a propriedade de terras agrícolas por "estrangeiros inelegíveis para a cidadania". Em 1920, uma Lei de Terras Estrangeiras mais forte também proibiu o arrendamento e a parceria. Ambas as leis se baseavam na presunção de que os asiáticos eram estrangeiros inelegíveis para a cidadania, o que, por sua vez, decorria de uma interpretação restrita do estatuto de naturalização. O estatuto foi reescrito após a Décima Quarta Emenda da constituição para permitir a naturalização de "pessoas brancas" e "estrangeiros de ascendência africana". Esse exclusivismo, claramente a intenção do Congresso, foi legitimado pela Suprema Corte em 1921, quando a cidadania foi negada a Takao Ozawa. No entanto, os nisseis eram cidadãos de nascimento e, portanto, os pais muitas vezes transferiam o título para seus filhos. A Lei de Imigração de 1924 proibiu todas as novas imigrações japonesas, com o efeito colateral de criar um hiato de gerações muito distinto entre os isseis e nisseis.

Muitos dos temores anti-japoneses surgiram de fatores econômicos combinados com a inveja, uma vez que muitos dos fazendeiros issei se tornaram muito bem-sucedidos em cultivar frutas e vegetais em solo que a maioria das pessoas considerava infértil. Outros medos eram de natureza militar - a Guerra Russo-Japonesa provou que os japoneses eram uma força a ser reconhecida e estimulou temores de conquista asiática - "o Perigo Amarelo". Esses fatores, mais a percepção de "alteridade" e "inescrutabilidade asiática" que tipificavam os estereótipos raciais americanos, influenciaram muito os eventos que se seguiram a Pearl Harbor.

No Rescaldo de Pearl Harbor

A partir de 7 de dezembro, o Departamento de Justiça organizou a prisão de 3.000 pessoas que considerou inimigos estrangeiros "perigosos", metade das quais eram japoneses. Entre os japoneses, os presos incluíam líderes comunitários envolvidos em organizações e grupos religiosos japoneses. A evidência de atividades subversivas reais não era um pré-requisito para a prisão. Ao mesmo tempo, as contas bancárias de todos os estrangeiros inimigos e todas as contas nas filiais americanas de bancos japoneses foram congeladas. Essas duas ações paralisaram a comunidade nipo-americana, privando-a de sua liderança e ativos financeiros.

No final de janeiro de 1942, muitos dos japoneses presos pelo Departamento de Justiça foram transferidos para campos de internação em Montana, Novo México e Dakota do Norte. Freqüentemente, suas famílias não faziam ideia de seu paradeiro por semanas. Alguns internos foram reunidos com suas famílias posteriormente em centros de realocação. No entanto, muitos permaneceram nos campos da Justiça durante a guerra.

Depois de Pearl Harbor, o choque de um ataque furtivo em solo americano causou histeria e paranóia generalizadas. Certamente não ajudou muito quando Frank Knox, secretário da Marinha de Roosevelt, culpou Pearl Harbor "no trabalho mais eficaz da quinta coluna que saiu desta guerra, exceto na Noruega". Aparentemente, Knox já percebeu que a falta de preparação dos militares locais ofuscou qualquer espionagem no sucesso do ataque, mas não queria que o país perdesse a fé na Marinha. Esse bode expiatório abriu as portas para manchetes sensacionalistas de jornais sobre sabotagem, atividades da quinta coluna e invasão iminente. Essas histórias não tinham base factual, mas alimentaram as crescentes suspeitas sobre os nipo-americanos (J.A.C.P. 1973). Na verdade, no que diz respeito aos ataques japoneses ao continente, os militares já haviam concluído que os ataques de ataque e fuga japoneses eram possíveis, mas que qualquer invasão em grande escala estava além da capacidade dos militares japoneses, assim como qualquer invasão do Japão pelos militares dos EUA.

"Necessidade militar"

Após o ataque a Pearl Harbor, a lei marcial foi declarada no Havaí e todos os civis ficaram sujeitos a restrições de viagem, segurança e toque de recolher impostas pelos militares. Barcos de pesca japoneses foram apreendidos e indivíduos considerados potencialmente perigosos foram presos.

Os políticos pediram o encarceramento em massa de pessoas de ascendência japonesa no Havaí. Mas os militares resistiram: um terço da população havaiana era de ascendência japonesa e os militares não tinham soldados suficientes para protegê-los ou navios para enviá-los ao continente. Mais importante, seu trabalho era crucial para a economia civil e militar das ilhas. No final, menos de 1.500 (de uma população de 150.000) foram confinados e eventualmente removidos para o continente.

Um dos principais atores na confusão após Pearl Harbor foi o tenente-general John L. DeWitt, comandante do Comando de Defesa Ocidental e do 4º Exército dos EUA. DeWitt tinha um histórico de preconceito contra americanos não-caucasianos, mesmo aqueles que já estavam no exército, e era facilmente influenciado por qualquer boato de sabotagem ou invasão japonesa iminente.

DeWitt estava convencido de que, se pudesse controlar todas as atividades civis na Costa Oeste, poderia evitar outro desastre do tipo de Pearl Harbor. J. Edgar Hoover, do FBI, ridicularizou a "histeria e falta de julgamento" da Divisão de Inteligência Militar de DeWitt, citando incidentes como a suposta sabotagem da linha de transmissão realmente causada pelo gado.

Não obstante, em seu Relatório Final (1943), DeWitt cita outras razões para a "necessidade militar" da evacuação, como supostas luzes de sinalização e transmissões de rádio não identificadas, nenhuma das quais jamais foi verificada. Ele também insistiu em apreender armas, munições, rádios e câmeras sem mandado. Ele os chamou de "esconderijos ocultos de contrabando", embora a maioria das armas apreendidas fosse de duas lojas legítimas de artigos esportivos.

Inicialmente, DeWitt não abraçou a remoção em larga escala de todos os nipo-americanos da Costa Oeste. Em 19 de dezembro de 1941, o general DeWitt recomendou "que a ação seja iniciada o mais cedo possível para reunir todos os súditos estrangeiros de quatorze anos de idade ou mais, de nações inimigas e removê-los" para o interior do país e mantê-los "sob restrição após a remoção ". Em 26 de dezembro, ele disse ao Provost Marshall General Allen W. Gullion que "Tenho muitas dúvidas de que seria um procedimento de bom senso tentar internar 117.000 japoneses neste teatro. Afinal de contas, um cidadão americano é um cidadão americano. E enquanto todos eles podem não ser leais, eu acho que podemos eliminar os desleais dos leais e prendê-los se necessário ".

Com o incentivo do coronel Karl Bendetson, chefe da Divisão de Estrangeiros do Provost Marshall, em 21 de janeiro, DeWitt recomendou ao Secretário da Guerra Henry Stimson o estabelecimento de pequenas "zonas proibidas" em torno de áreas estratégicas das quais os estrangeiros inimigos e seus filhos nativos fariam ser removidos, bem como algumas "zonas restritas" maiores, onde seriam mantidos sob estreita vigilância. Stimson e o procurador-geral Francis Biddle concordaram, embora Biddle estivesse determinado a não fazer nada para violar os direitos constitucionais dos nipo-americanos.

No entanto, em 9 de fevereiro, DeWitt pediu zonas proibidas muito maiores em Washington e Oregon, que incluíam as cidades inteiras de Portland, Seattle e Tacoma. Biddle recusou-se a ir junto, mas o presidente Roosevelt, convencido da necessidade militar, concordou em contornar o Departamento de Justiça. Roosevelt deu ao exército "carta branca" para fazer o que quisesse, com a ressalva de ser o mais razoável possível.

Dois dias depois, DeWitt apresentou suas recomendações finais nas quais pedia a remoção de todos os japoneses, nativos e estrangeiros, e "outras pessoas subversivas" de toda a área situada a oeste das montanhas Sierra Nevada e Cascade. DeWitt justificou esta remoção em larga escala com base na "necessidade militar", afirmando que "a raça japonesa é uma raça inimiga" e "o próprio fato de que nenhuma sabotagem ocorreu até o momento é uma indicação perturbadora e confirmadora de que tal ação será tomada".

Em 17 de fevereiro, Biddle fez um último esforço para convencer o presidente de que a evacuação era desnecessária. Além disso, o general Mark Clark do Quartel General em Washington, D.C., estava convencido de que a evacuação era contrária à necessidade militar, pois exigiria muitos soldados que, de outra forma, poderiam estar lutando. Ele argumentou que "nunca teremos uma defesa perfeita contra sabotagem, exceto às custas de outros esforços igualmente importantes." Em vez disso, ele recomendou proteger instalações críticas usando sistemas de passagem e permissão e prisões seletivas conforme necessário.

Enquanto isso, a comunidade nipo-americana, particularmente os nisseis, tentavam estabelecer sua lealdade tornando-se guardas de ataques aéreos e ingressando no exército (quando tinham permissão). Visto que tantos na liderança issei haviam sido presos durante as prisões iniciais, as organizações nisseis, especialmente a JACL, ganharam influência na comunidade nipo-americana. A política de cooperação e apaziguamento do JACL foi adotada por alguns nipo-americanos, mas difamada por outros.

No início, não houve um tratamento consistente para os nisseis que tentaram se alistar ou foram convocados. A maioria dos comitês do Serviço Seletivo os rejeitou, classificando-os como 4-F ou 4-C (inadequados para o serviço devido à raça ou ancestralidade), mas foram aceitos em outros. O Departamento de Guerra proibiu a indução adicional de Nisei depois de 31 de março de 1942, "Exceto quando especificamente autorizado em casos excepcionais." As exceções foram nisseis e kibeis bilíngues, que serviram como instrutores e intérpretes de línguas. Todos os registrantes de ascendência japonesa foram oficialmente classificados como 4-C após 14 de setembro de 1942.

Enquanto os militares debatiam as restrições aos nipo-americanos e limitavam seu envolvimento na guerra, a opinião pública na Costa Oeste estava crescendo em apoio ao confinamento de todas as pessoas de ascendência japonesa. O sentimento anti-nipo-americano na mídia foi tipificado por um editorial na Los Angeles Times: "Uma víbora é, no entanto, uma víbora onde quer que o ovo seja chocado - então um nipo-americano, nascido de pais japoneses - cresce para ser um japonês, não um americano".

Apesar da oposição de Biddle, do JACL e do General Mark Clark, em 19 de fevereiro de 1942, o presidente Roosevelt assinou a Ordem Executiva 9066, autorizando o Secretário da Guerra "a prescrever áreas militares em locais e na medida em que ele ou o Comandante Militar apropriado pode determinar, de qual qualquer ou todas as pessoas podem ser excluídas, e em relação ao qual, o direito de qualquer pessoa de entrar, permanecer ou sair estará sujeito a quaisquer restrições que o Secretário de Guerra ou o Comandante Militar apropriado possa impor em O Secretário da Guerra fica autorizado a fornecer aos residentes de qualquer área que sejam excluídos, transporte, alimentação, abrigo e outras acomodações que possam ser necessárias no julgamento do Secretário da Guerra ou do Comandante Militar. . "

Em meados de fevereiro, as audiências do comitê do Congresso liderado pelo congressista da Califórnia John Tolan foram realizadas na costa oeste para avaliar a necessidade de evacuação dos nipo-americanos. A esmagadora maioria das testemunhas apoiou a remoção de todos os japoneses, estrangeiros e cidadãos, da costa. O governador da Califórnia Culbert L. Olson e o procurador-geral Earl Warren apoiaram a remoção de todos os nipo-americanos das áreas costeiras, afirmando que era impossível dizer quais eram leais. Como de fatoPorta-vozes da comunidade japonesa, os líderes do JACL argumentaram contra a evacuação em massa, mas para provar sua lealdade prometeram estar prontos para cooperar se fosse considerada uma necessidade militar.

Outros eventos na Califórnia contribuíram para o clima tenso. Em 23 de fevereiro, um submarino japonês bombardeou a costa da Califórnia. Não causou nenhum dano sério, mas levantou temores de novas ações inimigas ao longo da costa dos EUA. Na noite seguinte, aconteceu a "Batalha de Los Angeles". Em resposta a um eco de radar não identificado, os militares pediram um blecaute e dispararam mais de 1.400 projéteis antiaéreos. Vinte nipo-americanos foram presos por supostamente sinalizarem aos invasores, mas o eco do radar revelou ser um balão meteorológico solto.

Mesmo antes da assinatura da Ordem Executiva 9066, a Marinha dos Estados Unidos havia começado a remoção de nipo-americanos de perto do porto de Los Angeles: em 14 de fevereiro de 1942, a Marinha anunciou que todas as pessoas de ascendência japonesa deveriam deixar Terminal Island até março 14. Em 24 de fevereiro o prazo foi prorrogado para 27 de fevereiro. Praticamente todos os chefes de família (a maioria pescadores) já haviam sido presos e removidos pelo FBI e as 500 famílias que moravam lá foram autorizadas a se mudarem por conta própria para qualquer lugar que desejassem. A maioria ficou na área de Los Angeles até serem novamente realocados pelo Exército dos EUA.

Evacuação

Mesmo depois da Ordem Executiva 9066, ninguém tinha certeza do que iria acontecer. Quem seria "excluído", onde estariam as "áreas militares" e para onde iriam as pessoas depois de terem sido "excluídas"?

O general DeWitt originalmente queria remover todos os estrangeiros japoneses, alemães e italianos. No entanto, a opinião pública (com alguns dissidentes vocais) era a favor da realocação de todos os nipo-americanos, cidadãos e estrangeiros, mas se opunha a qualquer evacuação em massa de estrangeiros alemães ou italianos, muito menos alemães ou italianos de segunda geração. O reitor Marshall Gullion, que sempre apoiou a realocação de nipo-americanos, só imaginou homens com mais de quatorze anos - cerca de 46.000 da Costa Oeste a. Enquanto os militares negociavam as possibilidades, a comunidade nipo-americana continuava preocupada. A maioria seguiu o exemplo do JACL e optou por cooperar com a evacuação como forma de provar sua lealdade. Alguns se opuseram veementemente à evacuação e mais tarde buscaram maneiras de evitá-la, alguns com processos judiciais que acabaram chegando ao Supremo Tribunal Federal.

DeWitt emitiu várias Proclamações Públicas sobre a evacuação, mas estas pouco fizeram para esclarecer a confusão; na verdade, criaram mais. Em 2 de março, a Proclamação Pública nº 1 dividiu Washington, Oregon, Califórnia e Arizona em duas áreas militares, numeradas 1 e 2. A Área Militar nº 1 foi subdividida em uma "zona proibida" ao longo da costa e uma adjacente " zona restrita. " Noventa e oito áreas menores também foram rotuladas como locais militares estrategicamente proibidos, presumivelmente. O anúncio era dirigido a "estrangeiros japoneses, alemães ou italianos" e a "qualquer pessoa de ascendência japonesa", mas não ordenava especificamente que ninguém partisse. No entanto, um comunicado à imprensa que acompanhava previa que todas as pessoas de ascendência japonesa seriam eventualmente excluídas da Área Militar Nº 1, mas provavelmente não da Área Militar Nº 2.

Naquela época, o governo não havia feito nenhum plano para ajudar as pessoas a se mudarem e, como a maioria dos bens dos isseis havia sido congelada no início da guerra, a maioria das famílias não tinha recursos para se mudar. No entanto, vários milhares de nipo-americanos tentaram voluntariamente se mudar. Mais de 9.000 pessoas se mudaram voluntariamente da Área Militar nº 1: destas, mais da metade se mudou para a parte da Califórnia da Área Militar nº 2, onde a Proclamação Pública nº 1 disse que nenhuma restrição ou proibição foi contemplada. Mais tarde, é claro, eles seriam evacuados à força da Área Militar nº 2. Um pouco mais sortudos foram os nipo-americanos que se mudaram para o interior do país: 1.963 se mudaram para o Colorado, 1.519 se mudaram para Utah, 305 se mudaram para Idaho, 208 se mudaram para o leste de Washington, 115 se mudaram para o leste do Oregon, 105 para o norte do Arizona, 83 para o Wyoming, 72 para o Illinois, 69 para o Nebraska e 366 para outros estados. Mas muitos dos que tentaram deixar a Costa Oeste descobriram que os estados do interior não estavam dispostos a aceitá-los. A percepção no interior era de que a Califórnia estava despejando seus "indesejáveis" e muitos refugiados foram rejeitados nas fronteiras estaduais, tiveram dificuldade para comprar gasolina ou foram recebidos com placas de "Não se procuram japoneses".

Em 11 de março, a Administração de Controle Civil em Tempo de Guerra (WCCA), controlada pelo Exército, foi criada para organizar e realizar a evacuação da Área Militar nº 1. A Proclamação Pública nº 2, em 16 de março, designou mais quatro áreas militares nos estados de Idaho , Montana, Nevada e Utah e mais 933 áreas proibidas. Embora DeWitt tenha imaginado a remoção de todos os nipo-americanos dessas áreas, esses planos nunca se concretizaram.

A Lei Pública nº 503, aprovada em 21 de março de 1942, tornou contravenção a violação de restrições em uma área militar, sujeita a multa de até US $ 5.000 ou um ano de prisão. A Proclamação Pública No. 3, em vigor em 27 de março, instituiu um toque de recolher das 20h00 às 6h00 na Área Militar No. 1 e listou áreas proibidas para todos os estrangeiros inimigos e "pessoas de ascendência japonesa". A Proclamação Pública No. 3 também exigia que "em todas as outras ocasiões, todas essas pessoas deverão estar apenas em seu local de residência ou emprego ou viajando entre esses locais ou a uma distância de não mais de cinco milhas de seu local de residência."

A evacuação voluntária terminou em 29 de março, quando a Proclamação Pública nº 4 proibiu todos os japoneses de deixar a Área Militar nº 1 até que fosse ordenada. Outras instruções estabeleceram centros de recepção como instalações de evacuação transitória e proibiram movimentos, exceto para um local aprovado fora da Área Militar No. 1.

A primeira evacuação sob os auspícios do Exército começou em 24 de março na Ilha de Bainbridge, perto de Seattle, e se repetiu em toda a costa oeste. Ao todo, 108 "Ordens de Exclusão de Civis" foram emitidas, cada uma destinada a afetar cerca de 1.000 pessoas. Após a notificação inicial, os residentes tiveram seis dias para se desfazerem de quase todos os seus pertences, embalando apenas "o que pode ser transportado pela família ou pelo indivíduo", incluindo roupas de cama, louças, roupas e talheres. O governo estava disposto a armazenar ou despachar alguns bens "por conta e risco do proprietário", mas muitos não confiavam nessa opção. A maioria das famílias vendeu suas propriedades e posses por quantias ridiculamente pequenas, enquanto outras confiavam em amigos e vizinhos para cuidar de suas propriedades.

Em 2 de junho de 1942, todos os japoneses na Área Militar nº 1, exceto alguns deixados para trás em hospitais, estavam sob custódia do exército. A imagem dos nipo-americanos é que eles aceitaram passivamente a evacuação. Existe uma filosofia japonesa "shikataganai" - ela não pode ser evitada. Assim, de fato, a grande maioria dos nipo-americanos resignou-se a seguir as ordens que os enviaram aos centros de montagem, o que para muitos foi uma forma de provar sua lealdade aos EUA.

Mas ocorreram alguns casos de resistência ativa à evacuação. Três semanas depois de sua suposta evacuação, Kuji Kurokawa foi encontrado, fraco demais para se mover devido à desnutrição, escondido no porão da casa onde trabalhou por 10 anos. Ele decidiu que não iria se registrar ou ser evacuado, "Eu sou um cidadão americano", explicou. Em outra história, talvez apócrifa, Hideo Murata, um veterano da Primeira Guerra Mundial do Exército dos EUA, cometeu suicídio em um hotel local em vez de ser evacuado.

Três nipo-americanos contestaram as ações do governo no tribunal. Minoru Yasui se ofereceu para o serviço militar após o ataque japonês a Pearl Harbor e foi rejeitado por causa de sua ascendência japonesa. Advogado, ele violou deliberadamente a lei do toque de recolher em sua cidade natal, Portland, Oregon, declarando que os cidadãos têm o dever de desafiar as regulamentações inconstitucionais. Gordon Hirabayashi, um estudante da Universidade de Washington, também violou deliberadamente o toque de recolher para nipo-americanos e desrespeitou as ordens de evacuação, alegando que o governo estava violando a 5ª emenda ao restringir a liberdade de japoneses-americanos inocentes. Fred Korematsu mudou seu nome, alterou suas características faciais e se escondeu. Ele foi posteriormente preso por permanecer em uma área restrita. No tribunal, Korematsu alegou que o governo não poderia prender um grupo de pessoas com base apenas na ancestralidade. Todos os três perderam seus casos. Yasui passou vários meses na prisão e foi enviado para o Minidoka Relocation Center, Hirabayashi passou um tempo na prisão e vários meses em uma prisão federal no Arizona, e Korematsu foi enviado para o Topaz Relocation Center.

De acordo com um autor, o único ato de "sabotagem" por um nipo-americano foi produto do processo de realocação. Quando disse para deixar sua casa e ir para um centro de montagem, um fazendeiro pediu uma prorrogação para colher sua safra de morango. Seu pedido foi negado, então ele arou sob o campo de morangos. Ele foi então preso por sabotagem, sob o argumento de que os morangos eram uma mercadoria necessária para o esforço de guerra. Ninguém foi autorizado a atrasar a evacuação para colher suas safras e, subsequentemente, os californianos enfrentaram a escassez de frutas e vegetais. Os nipo-americanos cultivavam 95% dos morangos do estado e um terço das safras de caminhões do estado.

Embora a justificativa para a evacuação fosse impedir a espionagem e a sabotagem, bebês recém-nascidos, crianças pequenas, idosos, enfermos, crianças de orfanatos e até crianças adotadas por pais caucasianos não estavam isentos de remoção. Qualquer pessoa com 1/16 ou mais sangue japonês foi incluída. Ao todo, mais de 17.000 crianças com menos de 10 anos, 2.000 pessoas com mais de 65 anos e 1.000 deficientes ou enfermos foram evacuados.


Legislação Antijaponesa na Califórnia - História

Um dos primeiros grupos de colonos que vieram do Japão para os Estados Unidos, o Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Farm Colony sob a liderança de John Schnell, chegou a Cold Hill, Condado de El Dorado, em junho de 1869. Colonos adicionais chegaram no outono de 1869. Esses primeiros imigrantes trouxeram amoreiras, casulos de seda, plantas de chá, raízes de bambu e outros produtos agrícolas. O Censo dos EUA de 1870 mostrou que 55 japoneses nos Estados Unidos, 33 estavam na Califórnia, com 22 vivendo em Gold Hill. Poucos anos após a fundação da colônia, os colonos se dispersaram, e seu empreendimento agrícola foi um fracasso.


Colônia Wakamatsu Chá e Fazenda de Seda, Condado de El Dorado

O Censo de 1880 mostrou 86 japoneses na Califórnia, com um total de 148 nos Estados Unidos. Possivelmente eram estudantes ou japoneses que haviam deixado ilegalmente seu país, uma vez que os trabalhadores japoneses não foram autorizados a deixar seu país até depois de 1884, quando um acordo foi assinado entre o governo japonês e as plantações de açúcar do Havaí para permitir a imigração de mão-de-obra. Do Havaí, muitos japoneses seguiram para o continente dos Estados Unidos. Em 1890, 2.038 japoneses residiam nos Estados Unidos deste número, 1.114 viviam na Califórnia.

Os trabalhadores das plantações de açúcar do Havaí foram cuidadosamente escolhidos. Em 1868, um grupo de japoneses saiu das ruas de Yokohama e enviado para o Havaí provou ser insatisfatório. Posteriormente, foi estabelecido um método sistemático de recrutamento de trabalhadores de regiões específicas do Japão. Nativos de Hiroshima, Kumamoto, Yamaguchi e Fukushima foram procurados por sua suposta especialização em agricultura, por seu trabalho árduo e por sua disposição para viajar. Imigrantes dessas prefeituras para a Califórnia constituíam o maior número de japoneses no estado.

Exceto por uma suspensão temporária da imigração para o Havaí em 1900, o fluxo de imigração do Japão permaneceu relativamente inalterado até 1907-08, quando a agitação de organizações de supremacia branca, sindicatos trabalhistas e políticos resultou no "Acordo de Cavalheiros", reduzindo ainda mais a imigração de trabalhadores do Japão. Uma cláusula do Acordo de Cavalheiros, entretanto, permitia que esposas e filhos de trabalhadores, bem como trabalhadores que já haviam estado nos Estados Unidos, continuassem a entrar no país. Até então, os imigrantes japoneses eram principalmente do sexo masculino. O Censo de 1900 indica que apenas 410 dos 24.326 japoneses eram mulheres. De 1908 a 1924, as mulheres japonesas continuaram a imigrar para os Estados Unidos, algumas como "noivas em fotos".


Noivas fotográficas japonesas na Ilha Angel, Condado de Marin [por volta de 1919]

No Japão, os casamentos arranjados eram a regra. Go-betweens arranged marriages between compatible males and females, based on careful matching of socio-economic status, personality, and family background. With the advent of photography, an exchange of photographs became a first step in this long process. Entering the bride's name in the groom's family registry legally constituted marriage. Those Japanese males who could afford the cost of traveling to Japan returned there to be married. Others resorted to long-distance, arranged marriages. The same procedure that would have occurred if the groom were in Japan was adhered to, and the bride would immigrate to the United States as the wife of a laborer. Not all issei were married in this manner, but many were. For wives who entered after 1910, the first glimpse of the United States was the Detention Barracks at Angel Island in San Francisco Bay. New immigrants were processed there, and given medical exams. As a result, this was the place where most "picture brides" saw their new husbands for the first time.

Those hoping to rid California of its Japanese population thought the Gentlemen's Agreement would end Japanese immigration. Instead, the Japanese population of California increased, both through new immigration and through childbirth. Anti-Japanese groups, citing the entry of "picture brides," complained that the Gentlemen's Agreement was being violated. A movement to totally exclude Japanese immigrants eventually succeeded with the Immigration Act of 1924. That legislation completely curtailed immigration from Japan until 1952 when an allotment of 100 im migrants per year was designated. A few refugees entered the country during the mid-1950s, as did Japanese wives of United States servicemen.


The Nisei

As the hopes of future immigrants were dashed, however, a new generation of Japanese Americans was making itself known. By 1930, half of the Japanese in the United States were Nissei—members of the U.S.-born second generation. Nisei were the children of two worlds: the traditional Japanese world maintained at home by their parents—the Issei—and the multiethnic U.S. culture that they were immersed in at school and at work. The Nisei were born U.S. citizens, and were more likely to speak English than Japanese, more likely to practice Christianity than Buddhism, and more likely to prefer "American" food, sports, music, and social mores than those of Japanese tradition. Many Nisei struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of their complex cultural heritage. However, they overwhelmingly identified themselves as Japanese Americans, not as Japanese in America.

The Japanese American Citizens League, an organization of Nisei professionals, declared in its creed:

I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very background makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this nation… I pledge myself… to defend her against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

These words were published in 1940. Before the next year was out, the Japanese American community would find its resolve, its resilience, and its faith in the nation put to a severe test.


Anti-Japanese Legislation in California - History

As with most people of color, Japanese Americans have suffered a variety of discriminatory practices, legislation, and restrictions. Perhaps this could have been expected considering the initial conditions under which Japanese were originally enticed to immigrate to the United States — as only a source of labor, with no plans for them to stay and participate actively in the life of the society.

Even as a source of labor, Japanese immigrants were criticized for being too numerous. They were seen as unassimilable and potentially capable of overrunning the state. The Asiatic Exclusion League, formed in May 1905, mounted a campaign to exclude Japanese and Koreans from the United States. Under pressure from the league, the San Francisco Board of Education ruled on October 11, 1906 that all Japanese and Korean students should join the Chinese at the segregated Oriental School that had been established in 1884. There were 93 Japanese students in the 23 San Francisco public schools at that time. Twenty-five of those students had been born in the United States.

To appease those Californians who were agitating for cessation of Japanese immigration without offending the Japanese government, President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated the 1907-08 Gentlemen's Agreement, whereby the Japanese government agreed not to issue passports to laborers immigrating to the United States. However, parents, wives, and children of laborers already in the United States could immigrate, as well as laborers who had already been here.

This agreement nevertheless stimulated the anti-Japanese movement. Rather than cutting off all immigration from Japan, the agreement resulted in a steady stream of Japanese women entering California. Soon thereafter, children were born, resulting in increases in the Japanese population, rather than decreases. Arranged marriage, sometimes with the exchange of photographs, was the accepted mode of contracting marriages in Japanese society. This practice allowed male issei immigrants to marry, and to send for their brides to join them in this country. The effect was to bolster the stereotyped image of Japanese as being sneaky and untrustworthy, even though the provisions of the Gentlemen's Agreement were being scrupulously maintained.

As the Japanese American population steadily increased, through immigration of picture brides and the birth of nisei children, anti-Japanese forces regrouped after World War I. Charges were made that the Japanese birth rate was three times as high as the general population's. The fact that Japanese females in prime child-bearing years were compared with White women from 15 to 45 years of age was not mentioned. The unassimilability of Japanese was charged. As part of the Immigration Act of 1924, immigration from Japan was completely cut off for 28 years.

Beginning in January 1909 and continuing until after World War II, anti-Japanese bills were introduced into the California legislature every year. The first to become law was the Webb-Hartley Law (known more commonly as the Alien Land Law of 1913), which limited land leases by "aliens ineligible to citizenship" to three years, and barred further land purchases. Amendments to this law in 1919 and 1920 further restricted land leasing agreements. Although the law contains no mention of Asians by name, it is clear that "aliens ineligible to citizenship" included, among others, Japanese, a group without access to U.S. citizenship and the target of anti-Asian groups during this period.

The issue of U.S. citizenship eventually was decided by the 1922 Supreme Court decision of Takao Ozawa v. United States, which declared that Japanese were ineligible for U.S. citizenship. "Free white persons" were made eligible for U.S. citizenship by Congress in 1790. "Aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent" were similarly designated by Congress in 1870. Due to some ambiguity about the term "white," some 420 Japanese had been naturalized by 1910, but a ruling by a U.S. attorney general to stop issuing naturalization papers to Japanese ended the practice in 1906. Ozawa had filed his naturalization papers in 1914. In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court judged that since Ozawa was neither a "free white person" nor an African by birth or descent, he did not have the right of naturalization as a Mongolian.

Influenced by the anti-Japanese movement, an amendment to the State Political Code in 1921 allowed establishment of separate schools for children of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, or Mongolian parentage. These children were not to be integrated into other public schools once separate schools were established. School districts in Sacramento County elected to maintain separate schools in the communities of Florin, Walnut Grove, Isleton, and Courtland. Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino children in these school districts attended segregated schools until World War II. In 1945, a Japanese American family challenged the constitutionality of segregated schools, and the Los Angeles County Superior Court concurred that segregation on the basis of race or ancestry violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The California legislature repealed the 1921 provision in 1947.

The most widely perpetrated discriminatory action toward West Coast Japanese Americans was the internment camp policy of World War II, which was set into motion by the signing of Executive Order 9066 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The executive order did not mention Japanese Americans by name, but the designation of military areas and the decision to exclude certain persons from these areas was directed toward Japanese Americans. Thirteen temporary detention camps in California were hastily established to hold Japanese Americans until more permanent camps in remote sections of the country could be constructed.

After Executive Order 9066 was issued, the vast majority of public proclamations emanating from Lt. General John DeWitt, Commander of the Western Defense Command, were directed toward controlling the movement and freedom of Japanese Americans. Similarly, the civilian exclusion orders, issued by DeWitt, directed Japanese Americans along the West Coast to report for detention at designated times and places.

Incarceration policy was challenged by Gordon Hirabayashi, who violated curfew regulations in the state of Washington Fred Korematsu of Oakland, who was prosecuted for knowingly remaining in an area forbidden by military orders Minoru Yasui, who was prosecuted for violation of curfew orders as a test case and Mitsuye Endo of Sacramento, who claimed unlawful detention. None of the judgments that resulted from these cases dealt directly with the constitutionality of incarcerating more than 120,000 Japanese Americans. But Ex parte Endo, issued December 16, 1944, did result in the rescinding of exclusion orders, effective January 2, 1945, which eventually closed the 10 concentration camps in the United States.

During the internment years, several legislative actions affected thousands of Japanese Americans. A California statute of 1943, amended in 1945, prohibited "aliens ineligible to citizenship" from earning their living as commercial fishermen in coastal waters. Torao Takahashi brought suit, and after a tortuous sequence of events, including a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, resident alien Japanese fishermen were again allowed to fish the waters off the California coast in 1948.

In 1944, a federal statute amended the Nationality Act of 1940 to permit U.S. citizens to renounce citizenship during wartime. The Department of Justice intended that leaders of disturbances at the Tule Lake Segregation Center renounce their citizenship, therefore making themselves eligible for further detention when the camps were dismantled. Instead, 5,522 renunciations came from Japanese Americans (5,371 were from persons confined at Tule Lake), rather than the several hundred expected from pro-Japan elements. When the concentration camps were closed, many internees regretted renouncing their U.S. citizenship, citing coercion, intimidation, and fears of hostility by the dominant society. Lawsuits to revalidate citizenship continued until 1965, including Abo v. Clark (77 F. Supp. 806), which returned U.S. citizenship to 4,315 nisei.

During World War II, while Japanese and Japanese Americans were unable to defend themselves in court, California's Attorney General was allocated additional funds to prosecute violations of the Alien Land Law of 1913. A total of 79 cases were prosecuted, including 59 after the war. The first challenge to the Alien Land Law was Harada v. State of California, in which the Superior Court of Riverside County declared in 1918 that Jukichi Harada could purchase property in the name of his children, who were U.S. citizens though still minors. Subsequent court cases in other jurisdictions had differing results, some ruling that minor children could not own property.

Two escheat cases had particular significance in invalidating the Alien Land Law. The case of Oyama v. State of California in 1948 determined that non-citizen parents could purchase land as gifts for citizen children. The Fujii v. State of California case in 1952 resulted in the Alien Land Law of 1913 being declared unconstitutional. Legal obstacles to land purchases by Asians were thus removed.

To provide partial restitution for losses and damages resulting from the internment, an Evacuation Claims Act was passed by Congress. While losses by Japanese Americans were conservatively estimated to be around $400,000,000, only 10 percent of this amount was disbursed to former internees. The issue remains alive today in 1981, with the establishment of a Congressional Commission to investigate the historical, legal, economical, and psychological impacts of the forced internment of over 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II.

Japanese Americans have also endured informal discriminatory practices. Shopping, dining, and recreational activities at some business establishments were denied to Japanese Americans in previous years. Restrictive covenants in housing affected where they lived. When deceased members of the highly decorated 442nd Combat team were returned to the United States after World War II, some cemeteries refused to allow them gravesites because of their ancestry. In the past, some occupations have been closed to Japanese Americans, yet others such as gardening have been considered particularly suitable for their temperament, skills, and social standing in the society. Outward manifestations of discriminatory practices toward Japanese Americans can be subtle, but are still very much in existence as recent legal cases involving discrimination in employment promotion indicate.


St. Andrews Methodist Church, Kern County [circa 1929]


Anti-Japanese sentiments range from animosity towards the Japanese government's actions and disdain for Japanese culture to racism against the Japanese people. Sentiments of dehumanization have been fueled by the anti-Japanese propaganda of the Allied governments in World War II this propaganda was often of a racially disparaging character. Anti-Japanese sentiment may be strongest in China, North Korea, and South Korea, [5] [6] [7] [8] due to atrocities committed by the Japanese military. [9]

In the past, anti-Japanese sentiment contained innuendos of Japanese people as barbaric. Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan was intent to adopt Western ways in an attempt to join the West as an industrialized imperial power, but a lack of acceptance of the Japanese in the West complicated integration and assimilation. One commonly held view was that the Japanese were evolutionarily inferior (Navarro 2000, ". a date which will live in infamy"). Japanese culture was viewed with suspicion and even disdain.

While passions have settled somewhat since Japan's surrender in World War II, tempers continue to flare on occasion over the widespread perception that the Japanese government has made insufficient penance for their past atrocities, or has sought to whitewash the history of these events. [10] Today, though the Japanese government has effected some compensatory measures, anti-Japanese sentiment continues based on historical and nationalist animosities linked to Imperial Japanese military aggression and atrocities. Japan's delay in clearing more than 700,000 (according to the Japanese Government [11] ) pieces of life-threatening and environment contaminating chemical weapons buried in China at the end of World War II is another cause of anti-Japanese sentiment. [ citação necessária ]

Periodically, individuals within Japan spur external criticism. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was heavily criticized by South Korea and China for annually paying his respects to the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines all those who fought and died for Japan during World War II, including 1,068 convicted war criminals. Right-wing nationalist groups have produced history textbooks whitewashing Japanese atrocities, [12] and the recurring controversies over these books occasionally attract hostile foreign attention.

Some anti-Japanese sentiment originates from business practices used by some Japanese companies, such as dumping.

Australia Edit

In Australia, the White Australia policy was partly inspired by fears in the late 19th century that if large numbers of Asian immigrants were allowed, they would have a severe and adverse effect on wages, the earnings of small business people, and other elements of the standard of living. Nevertheless, a significant numbers of Japanese immigrants arrived in Australia prior to 1900, perhaps most significantly in the town of Broome. By the late 1930s, Australians feared that Japanese military strength might lead to expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and perhaps even an invasion of Australia itself. That resulted in a ban on iron ore exports to the Empire of Japan, from 1938. During World War II, atrocities were frequently committed to Australians who surrendered (or attempted to surrender) to Japanese soldiers, most famously the ritual beheading of Leonard Siffleet, which was photographed, and incidents of cannibalism and the shooting down of ejected pilots' parachutes. Anti-Japanese feelings were particularly provoked by the sinking of the unarmed Hospital Ship Centauro (painted white and with Red Cross markings), with 268 dead. The treatment of Australians prisoners of war was also a factor, with over 2,800 Australian POWs dying on the Burma Railway alone.

Brazil Edit

Similarly to Argentina and Uruguay, the Brazilian elite in the 19th and the 20th centuries desired the country's racial whitening. The country encouraged European immigration, but non-white immigration always faced considerable backlash. The communities of Japanese immigrants were seen as an obstacle of the whitening of Brazil and were seen, among other concerns, as being as particularly tendentious to form ghettos ans having high rates of endogamy. Oliveira Viana, a Brazilian jurist, historian, and sociologist described the Japanese immigrants as follows: "They (Japanese) are like sulfur: insoluble." The Brazilian magazine O Malho in its edition of December 5, 1908, issued a charge of Japanese immigrants with the following legend: "The government of São Paulo is stubborn. After the failure of the first Japanese immigration, it contracted 3,000 yellow people. It insists on giving Brazil a race diametrically opposite to ours." [13] On 22 October 1923, Representative Fidélis Reis produced a bill on the entry of immigrants, whose fifth article was as follows: "The entry of settlers from the black race into Brazil is prohibited. For Asian [immigrants] there will be allowed each year a number equal to 5% of those residing in the country. " [14]

Years before World War II, the government of President Getúlio Vargas initiated a process of forced assimilation of people of immigrant origin in Brazil. In 1933, a constitutional amendment was approved by a large majority and established immigration quotas without mentioning race or nationality and prohibited the population concentration of immigrants. According to the text, Brazil could not receive more than 2% of the total number of entrants of each nationality that had been received in the last 50 years. Only the Portuguese were excluded. The measures did not affect the immigration of Europeans such as Italians and Spaniards, who had already entered in large numbers and whose migratory flow was downward. However, immigration quotas, which remained in force until the 1980s, restricted Japanese immigration, as well as Korean and Chinese immigration. [15] [13] [16]

When Brazil sided with the Allies and declared war to Japan in 1942, all communication with Japan was cut off, the entry of new Japanese immigrants was forbidden, and many restrictions affected the Japanese Brazilians. Japanese newspapers and teaching the Japanese language in schools were banned, which left Portuguese as the only option for Japanese descendants. As many Japanese immigrants could not understand Portuguese, it became exceedingly difficult for them to obtain any extra-communal information. [17] In 1939, research of Estrada de Ferro Noroeste do Brasil in São Paulo showed that 87.7% of Japanese Brazilians read newspapers in the Japanese language, a much higher literacy rate than the general populace at the time. [13] Japanese Brazilians could not travel without safe conduct issued by the police, Japanese schools were closed, and radio receivers was confiscated to prevent transmissions on shortwave from Japan. The goods of Japanese companies were confiscated and several companies of Japanese origin had interventions by the government. Japanese Brazilians were prohibited from driving motor vehicles, and the drivers employed by Japanese had to have permission from the police. Thousands of Japanese immigrants were arrested or deported from Brazil on suspicion of espionage. [13] On 10 July 1943, approximately 10,000 Japanese and German and Italian immigrants who lived in Santos had 24 hours to move away from the Brazilian coast. The police acted without any notice. About 90% of people displaced were Japanese. To reside in coastal areas, the Japanese had to have a safe conduct. [13] In 1942, the Japanese community who introduced the cultivation of pepper in Tomé-Açu, in Pará, was virtually turned into a "concentration camp". his time, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, DC, Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa, encouraged the government of Brazil to transfer all Japanese Brazilians to "internment camps" without the need for legal support, just as as was done with the Japanese residents in the United States. However, no suspicion of activities of Japanese against "national security" was ever confirmed. [13]

Even after the end of the war, anti-Japanese sentiment persisted in Brazil. During the National Constituent Assembly of 1946, the representative of Rio de Janeiro Miguel Couto Filho proposed an amendment to the Constitution: "It is prohibited the entry of Japanese immigrants of any age and any origin in the country." In the final vote, a tie with 99 votes in favour and 99 against. Senator Fernando de Melo Viana, who chaired the session of the Constituent Assembly, had the casting vote and rejected the constitutional amendment. By only one vote, the immigration of Japanese people to Brazil was not prohibited by the Brazilian Constitution of 1946. [13]

In the second half of the 2010s, a certain anti-Japanese feeling has grown in Brazil. The current Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, was accused of making statements considered discriminatory against Japanese people, which generated repercussions in the press and in the Japanese-Brazilian community, [18] [19] which is considered the largest in the world outside of Japan. [20] In addition, in 2020, possibly as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, some incidents of xenophobia and abuse were reported to Japanese-Brazilians in cities such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. [21] [22] [23] [24]

China Edit

Anti-Japanese sentiment is felt very strongly in China and distrust, hostility and negative feelings towards Japan and the Japanese people and culture is widespread in China. Anti-Japanese sentiment is a phenomenon that mostly dates back to modern times (since 1868). Like many Western powers during the era of imperialism, Japan negotiated treaties that often resulted in the annexation of land from China towards the end of the Qing dynasty. Dissatisfaction with Japanese settlements and the Twenty-One Demands by the Japanese government led to a serious boycott of Japanese products in China.

Today, bitterness persists in China [25] over the atrocities of the Second Sino-Japanese War and Japan's postwar actions, particularly the perceived lack of a straightforward acknowledgment of such atrocities, the Japanese government's employment of known war criminals, and Japanese historic revisionism in textbooks. In elementary school, children are taught about Japanese war crimes in detail. For example, thousands of children are brought to the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing by their elementary schools and required to view photos of war atrocities, such as exhibits of records of the Japanese military forcing Chinese workers into wartime labor, [26] the Nanking Massacre, [27] and the issues of comfort women. After viewing the museum, the children's hatred of the Japanese people was reported to significantly increase. Despite the time that has passed since the end of the war, discussions about Japanese conduct during it can still evoke powerful emotions today, partly because most Japanese are aware of what happened during it although their society has never engaged in the type of introspection which has been common in Germany after the Holocaust. [28] Hence, the usage of Japanese military symbols are still controversial in China, such as the incident in which the Chinese pop singer Zhao Wei was seen wearing a Japanese war flag while he was dressed for a fashion magazine photo shoot in 2001. [29] Huge responses were seen on the Internet, a public letter demanding a public apology was also circulated by a Nanking Massacre survivor, and the singer was even attacked. [30] According to a 2017 BBC World Service Poll, only 22% of Chinese people view Japan's influence positively, and 75% express a negative view, making China the most anti-Japanese nation in the world. [1]

Anti-Japanese film industry Edit

Anti-Japanese sentiment can also be seen in war films which are currently being produced and broadcast in Mainland China. More than 200 anti-Japanese films were produced in China in 2012 alone. [31] In one particular situation involving a more moderate anti-Japanese war film, the government of China banned the 2000 film, Devils on the Doorstep because it depicted a Japanese soldier being friendly with Chinese villagers. [32]

França Editar

Japan's public service broadcaster, NHK, provides a list of overseas safety risks for traveling, and in early 2020, it listed anti-Japanese discrimination as a safety risk on travel to France and some other European countries, possibly because of fears over the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors. [33] Signs of rising anti-Japanese sentiment in France include an increase in anti-Japanese incidents reported by Japanese nationals, such as being mocked on the street and refused taxi service, and least one Japanese restaurant has been vandalized. [34] [35] [36] A group of Japanese students on a study tour in Paris received abuse by locals. [37] Another group of Japanese citizens was targeted by acid attacks, which prompted the Japanese embassy as well as the foreign ministry to issue a warning to Japanese nationals in France, urging caution. [38] [39] Due to rising discrimination, a Japanese TV announcer in Paris said it's best not to speak Japanese in public. [40]

Alemanha Editar

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), anti-Japanese sentiment and discrimination has been rising in Germany. [41]

Media sources have reported a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment in Germany, with some Japanese residents saying suspicion and contempt toward them have increased noticeably. [42] In line with those sentiments, there have been a rising number of anti-Japanese incidents such as at least one major football club kicking out all Japanese fans from the stadium, locals throwing raw eggs at homes where Japanese people live, and a general increase in the level of harassment toward Japanese residents. [43] [44] [45]

Indonésia Editar

In a press release, the embassy of Japan in Indonesia stated that incidents of discrimination and harassment of Japanese people had increased, and they were possibly partly related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and it also announced that it had set up a help center in order to assist Japanese residents in dealing with those incidents. [46] In general, there have been reports of widespread anti-Japanese discrimination and harassment in the country, with hotels, stores, restaurants, taxi services and more refusing Japanese customers and many Japanese people were no longer allowed in meetings and conferences. The embassy of Japan has also received at least a dozen reports of harassment toward Japanese people in just a few days. [47] [48] According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), anti-Japanese sentiment and discrimination has been rising in Indonesia. [41]

Edição da Coreia

The issue of anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea is complex and multifaceted. Anti-Japanese attitudes in the Korean Peninsula can be traced as far back as the Japanese pirate raids and the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598), but they are largely a product of the Japanese occupation of Korea which lasted from 1910 to 1945 and the subsequent revisionism of history textbooks which have been used by Japan's educational system since World War II.

Today, issues of Japanese history textbook controversies, Japanese policy regarding the war, and geographic disputes between the two countries perpetuate that sentiment, and the issues often incur huge disputes between Japanese and South Korean Internet users. [49] South Korea, together with Mainland China, may be considered as among the most intensely anti-Japanese societies in the world. [50] Among all the countries that participated in BBC World Service Poll in 2007 and 2009, South Korea and the People's Republic of China were the only ones whose majorities rated Japan negatively. [51] [52]

Philippines Edit

Anti-Japanese sentiment in the Philippines can be traced back to the Japanese occupation of the country during World War II and its aftermath. An estimated 1 million Filipinos out of a wartime population of 17 million were killed during the war, and many more Filipinos were injured. Nearly every Filipino family was affected by the war on some level. Most notably, in the city of Mapanique, survivors have recounted the Japanese occupation during which Filipino men were massacred and dozens of women were herded in order to be used as comfort women. Today the Philippines has peaceful relations with Japan. In addition, Filipinos are generally not as offended as Chinese or Koreans are by the claim from some quarters that the atrocities are given little, if any, attention in Japanese classrooms. This feeling exists as a result of the huge amount of Japanese aid which was sent to the country during the 1960s and 1970s. [53]

The Davao Region, in Mindanao, had a large community of Japanese immigrants which acted as a fifth column by welcoming the Japanese invaders during the war. The Japanese were hated by the Moro Muslims and the Chinese. [54] The Moro juramentadoss performed suicide attacks against the Japanese, and no Moro juramentado ever attacked the Chinese, who were not considered enemies of the Moro, unlike the Japanese. [55] [56] [57] [58]

Editar Taiwan

The Kuomintang (KMT), which took over Taiwan in the 1940s, held strong anti-Japanese sentiment and sought to eradicate traces of the Japanese culture in Taiwan. [59]

During the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations in East Asia, Taiwan remained noticeably quieter than the PRC or Korea, with Taiwan-Japan relations regarded at an all-time high. However, the KMT victory in 2008 was followed by a boating accident resulting in Taiwanese deaths, which caused recent tensions. Taiwanese officials began speaking out on the historical territory disputes regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, which resulted in an increase in at least perceived anti-Japanese sentiment. [60]

Russian Empire and Soviet Union Edit

In the Russian Empire, the Japanese victory during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 halted Russia's ambitions in the East and left it humiliated. During the later Russian Civil War, Japan was part of the Allied interventionist forces that helped to occupy Vladivostok until October 1922 with a puppet government under Grigorii Semenov. At the end of World War II, the Red Army accepted the surrender of nearly 600,000 Japanese POWs after Emperor Hirohito announced the Japanese surrender on 15 August 473,000 of them were repatriated, 55,000 of them had died in Soviet captivity, and the fate of the others is unknown. Presumably, many of them were deported to China or North Korea and forced to serve as laborers and soldiers. [61]

Estados Unidos Editar

Pre-20th century Edit

In the United States, anti-Japanese sentiment had its beginnings long before World War II. As early as the late 19th century, Asian immigrants were subjected to racial prejudice in the United States. Laws were passed which openly discriminated against Asians and sometimes, they particularly discriminated against Japanese. Many of these laws stated that Asians could not become US citizens and they also stated that Asians could not be granted basic rights such as the right to own land. These laws were greatly detrimental to the newly-arrived immigrants because they denied them the right to own land and forced many of them who were farmers to become migrant workers. Some cite the formation of the Asiatic Exclusion League as the start of the anti-Japanese movement in California. [62]

Edição do início do século 20

Anti-Japanese racism and the belief in the Yellow Peril in California intensified after the Japanese victory over the Russian Empire during the Russo-Japanese War. On 11 October 1906, the San Francisco, California Board of Education passed a regulation in which children of Japanese descent would be required to attend racially-segregated separate schools. Japanese immigrants then made up approximately 1% of the population of California, and many of them had come under the treaty in 1894 which had assured free immigration from Japan.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, China, in 1931 and was roundly criticized in the US. In addition, efforts by citizens outraged at Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanking Massacre, led to calls for American economic intervention to encourage Japan to leave China. The calls played a role in shaping American foreign policy. As more and more unfavorable reports of Japanese actions came to the attention of the American government, embargoes on oil and other supplies were placed on Japan out of concern for the Chinese people and for the American interests in the Pacific. Furthermore, European-Americans became very pro-China and anti-Japan, an example being a grassroots campaign for women to stop buying silk stockings because the material was procured from Japan through its colonies.

When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, Western public opinion was decidedly pro-China, with eyewitness reports by Western journalists on atrocities committed against Chinese civilians further strengthening anti-Japanese sentiments. African-American sentiments could be quite different than the mainstream and included organizations like the Pacific Movement of the Eastern World (PMEW), which promised equality and land distribution under Japanese rule. The PMEW had thousands of members hopefully preparing for liberation from white supremacy with the arrival of the Japanese Imperial Army.


Mexican American Immigration, and Discrimination, Begins

The story of Latino-American discrimination largely begins in 1848, when the United States won the Mexican-American War. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which marked the war’s end, granted 55 percent of Mexican territory to the United States. With that land came new citizens. The Mexicans who stayed in what was now U.S. territory were granted citizenship and the country gained a considerable Mexican-American population.

As the 19th century wore on, political events in Mexico made emigration to the United States popular. This was welcome news to American employers like the Southern Pacific Railroad, which desperately needed cheap labor to help build new tracks. The railroad and other companies flouted existing immigration laws that banned importing contracted labor and sent recruiters into Mexico to convince Mexicans to emigrate.

Anti-Latino sentiment grew along with immigration. Latinos were barred entry into Anglo establishments and segregated into urban barrios in poor areas. Though Latinos were critical to the U.S. economy and often were American citizens, everything from their language to the color of their skin to their countries of origin could be used as a pretext for discrimination. Anglo-Americans treated them as a foreign underclass and perpetuated stereotypes that those who spoke Spanish were lazy, stupid and undeserving. In some cases, that prejudice turned fatal.


CALIFORNIA ALIEN LAND LAW

CALIFORNIA ALIEN LAND LAW. Responding to the strong anti-Asian sentiments among voters, the California legislature passed the Alien Land Law of 1913. The act was amended and extended by popular initiative in 1920 and by the legislature in 1923 and 1927. Aimed at the largely rural Japanese population, the law, with a few exceptions, banned individual aliens who were not eligible for citizenship (under the Naturalization Act of 1870 this included all persons of Asian descent born out-side of the United States), as well as corporations controlled by such aliens, from owning real property. Similar laws were passed in other western states. The law was repealed in 1956 by popular vote.


Toward Total Exclusion

As anti-Asian feelings grew more pronounced, immigrants from India—many of whom began arriving in the United States in the 1890s—became one of the first groups affected by the new laws. At the time, federal immigration restrictions fell into two categories: generalized groups (for example, paupers and anarchists) and individual nationalities (for example, Japanese and Chinese). But, by 1911, Asian Indians had become a category all their own. As a new target for exclusionists, the government classified them as “Hindu” no matter their religion or ethnicity. 36

Congress went even further and passed the Immigration Act of 1917, creating an “Asiatic Barred Zone” that excluded Chinese, Asian Indians, Burmese, Thai,and Malays and extended to parts of Russia, the Arabian peninsula, Afghanistan, Polynesia, and all East Indian islands—about 500 million people in total. The Woodrow Wilson administration omitted Japan because its immigrants already faced a number of prohibitions. The law also exempted the Philippines since its residents, as members of an American territory, were U.S. nationals and legally eligible to move to the States. 37

After the White House changed hands in 1921, the Republican Congress, working with the new Republican presidential administration of Warren G. Harding, redoubled its efforts to overhaul America’s immigration policy. Within a month of being introduced, the national origins quota system became law on May 19, 1921. 39 The quota law set total annual immigration at 355,000, or 3 percent of the foreign-born population during the last Census in 1910. Federal officials used the same calculus to determine the number of immigrants allowed on a nation-by-nation basis. 40

Immigration hard-liners who had long opposed Asian immigration began worrying that America would experience a surge of refugees from hard-hit southern and eastern Europe after the war. In 1923 President Calvin Coolidge called for new legislation in order to limit immigration completely, and Congress quickly obliged. In the House, the Immigration and Naturalization Committee, led by Albert Johnson of Washington, who had long opposed Japanese immigration, began working on ways to tighten the quota system, pushing the baseline numbers back from the 1910 Census to the 1890 Census, which were lower and would therefore be more restrictive. 41

The problem, however, was that Japan had become a global power whose naval strength trailed only the United States and Britain. State Department officials feared that, if the bill became law, whatever cooperation existed between America and Japan in their work to maintain political stability in the Pacific basin would end. 43 Nevertheless, the bill cruised through the House, passing 323 to 71. When the White House and the Japanese ambassador tried to pressure the Senate into removing the clause, the plan backfired. The Senate overwhelmingly approved the immediate exclusion clause. President Coolidge signed the immigration bill into law on May 26, 1924. 44

The impact of the law was arguably greatest in Japan, where many resented the section that singled them out as “an inferior race.” 46 Somewhat optimistically, the Japanese government expected the immigration restriction to relax over time as the commercial interests between Japan and the United States strengthened. Nevertheless, Japan began viewing the United States, instead of the Soviet Union, as its primary military and naval adversary. 47 That shift would have devastating consequences for America’s two major Pacific territories—the Philippines and Hawaii—during World War II.

But even the Philippines and Hawaii, which the United States assumed control over at the turn of the century, were not immune to some level of exclusion during the 40 years preceding the war. Beginning in 1898, the experience of the United States in the Philippines and Hawaii legalized the convergence of exclusionary practices at home and abroad as ideas about race and empire conflicted with American traditions of democracy and self-government.


The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States*

The Arkansas legislature in 1943 enacted an anti-Japanese land law. It declares that no Japanese or a descendant of Japanese shall ever purchase or hold title to any lands in the State of Arkansas. Since those laws are in reality aimed at the Japanese, Arkansas raises to eleven the count of states that have anti-Japanese land laws. The constitutional issue is whether California can pick out of her half-million alien residents, 25,000 Japanese aliens, together with imperceptible number of Korean, Malay, and Polynesian aliens. The Census of 1940, in reporting the occupations of persons fourteen years old and older, shows that over ten thousand alien Japanese were engaged in farming in California. California law forbids Japanese aliens to hold any legal interest in land, except leasehold for commercial and residential purposes, and the concept of a legal interest in land is stretched to include the holding of a share in a corporation.


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